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Abstract Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) is a
contextual–behavioral approach to psychotherapy and other
behavioral health concerns that has progressively attracted
attention from both researchers and clinicians. ACT’s psycho-
logical flexibility model relies on middle-level terms that, de-
spite being less precise than behavioral principles, are seen as
being valuable for teaching and practicing ACT. One such
term is cognitive defusion, which refers to the reduction of
stimulus function transformation that occurs through verbal
relations. In other words, defusion aims to minimize the influ-
ence of verbal relations, such as thoughts, on behavior, when
doing so leads to adaptive behavior and valued living.
Recently, some authors have stressed the importance of func-
tionally defining middle-level terms, establishing clear links
between the concept and basic behavioral processes. This ar-
ticle begins this endeavor by analyzing these links with re-
spect to cognitive defusion. First, we briefly contextualize
ACT’s theoretical roots. Second, we present cognitive
defusion as a therapeutic intervention, reviewing its objec-
tives, procedures, outcomes, and hypothesized processes as
stated in the relevant literature. Third, the outlined process of
change is critically examined, leading to a new conceptualiza-
tion of cognitive defusion. Finally, the conceptual, clinical,
and research implications of this new conceptualization are
considered.
Keywords acceptance and commitment therapy . cognitive
defusion . process of change . middle-level terms . relational
frame theory
Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl,
& Wilson, 2012b) is a transdiagnostic, contextual–behavioral
approach to psychotherapy and other behavioral health con-
cerns that is considered foundational to third-wave cognitive
and behavioral therapies (Hayes, 2004). ACT has demonstrat-
ed efficacy across a range of clinical problems (cf. A-Tjak
et al., 2014; Powers, Vörding, & Emmelkamp, 2009),
resulting in its designation as an empirically supported psy-
chological treatment with strong research support for chronic
pain and modest research support for depression, mixed anx-
iety, obsessive–compulsive disorder, and psychosis (Division
12 of the American Psychological Association, 2016). ACT’s
philosophical and theoretical development and its research,
implementation, and dissemination strategies are closely
linked to contextual behavioral science (CBS), a psychologi-
cal scientific paradigm heavily influenced by early radical
behavioral thinking and behavior analysis (cf. Hayes,
Barnes-Holmes, & Wilson, 2012a; Levin, Twohig, & Smith,
2016; Vilardaga, Hayes, Levin, & Muto, 2009).
Among CBS’s strategic proposals for scientific progress is
the importance of “middle-level” terms: clinically useful in-
terfaces that describe complex sets of functional relations be-
tween the individual and the environment that in turn are
based on behavioral principles (Vilardaga et al., 2009). They
possess looser precision and lower levels of process specific-
ity than basic behavioral processes such as reinforcement.
Nevertheless, some argue that middle-level terms may be
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useful for training, dissemination, and clinical practice, espe-
cially for people without a thorough foundation in behavioral
theory who are faced with complex human behavioral situa-
tions and challenges (Hayes et al., 2012a; Levin et al., 2016;
Vilardaga et al., 2009). Currently, middle-level terms are at the
core of ACT’s psychological flexibility model, which presents
six middle-level processes to target during treatment in order
to develop and maintain psychological flexibility: acceptance,
cognitive defusion, contact with the present moment, self-as-
context, values, and committed action (Hayes & Strosahl,
2004).
Some authors have suggested that the pragmatic value of
any middle-level term is dependent upon the clarity of the
links between the term and specific sets of underlying func-
tional relations and have questioned the existence of such
links with respect to the components of ACT’s clinical model
(Barnes-Holmes, Hussey, McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, &
Foody, 2016; McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, Hussey, &
Barnes-Holmes, 2015). In this line of reasoning, the philo-
sophical and theoretical foundations of any middle-level term
should be as well defined as possible—an effort invited by the
CBS approach (Hayes et al., 2012a). This maximizes the prag-
matic utility of middle-level terms by preventing the confla-
tion of multiple processes in a single concept and minimizes
the dissemination of middle-level terms into practice without
functional clarity. Otherwise, middle-level terms may not ser-
vice either the CBS practitioner or the behavioral psychologist
more generally.
The objective of this article is to consider the middle-level
term cognitive defusion as it is currently used within ACTand
to clarify the functional link between this concept and basic
learning processes. The article first contextualizes ACT in its
theoretical roots, primarily the role of language in psycholog-
ical problems. Following this, cognitive defusion is presented
as a therapeutic intervention to address problems caused by
human language, outlining its procedures, processes, and out-
comes. Third, the proposed mechanism of change in cognitive
defusion exercises is critically examined, and an alternative
conceptualization is put forward. Finally, the conceptual, clin-
ical, and research implications of the new proposal are
considered.
Theoretical Foundations of ACT: Relational Frame
Theory
The theoretical rationale for cognitive defusion arises from the
functional account of language and cognition provided by
relational frame theory (RFT; Dymond & Roche, 2013;
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). The foundational
position of RFT is that the generalized operant of arbitrarily
applicable relational responding (AARR) is the basis of hu-
man language (Hayes et al., 2001). Relational responding
refers to responding that is not solely controlled by a stimulus
and its directly conditioned functions but rather by relations
between stimuli. Arbitrarily applicable expresses that the
stimuli in a controlling relation do not need to share formal
(i.e., physical) characteristics.
AARR is a learned behavior that requires a history of
multiple-exemplar training (Luciano et al., 2009). In other
words, the social environment teaches the individual, through
differential reinforcement, to respond relationally to several
sets of stimuli (e.g., trees, houses, cars, toys) regarding numer-
ous physical properties (e.g., color, size, weight) in direct and
reverse order (A–B and B–A). This extensive history allows
the individual to abstract the common element across these
interactions: a verbal cue that signals the discriminated re-
sponse that is likely to be reinforced (e.g., the word same).
Once abstracted, this cue can exert contextual control over
behavior (i.e., relational context) by indicating the type of
relation that applies among stimuli (such as coordination, op-
position, distinction, comparison, hierarchy, temporality, spa-
tiality, and causality) and thereby control a particular pattern
of responding in accordance with the specified relation. These
different patterns of responding have been labeled relational
frames.
Once AARR is well established in the person’s repertoire,
the formation of a few relations among stimuli will lead to the
emergence of new relations that were not directly taught, giv-
en an appropriate relational context. These derived relations
are characterized by mutual entailment (if A → B, then B →
A) and combinatorial entailment (if A → B and A→ C, then
B → C). Importantly, a stimulus may have its function trans-
formed through direct or derived relations—a process docu-
mented experimentally across multiple functions and relation-
al frames (e.g., Augustson & Dougher, 1997; Dougher,
Augustson, Markham, Greenway, & Wulfert, 1994;
Dougher, Hamilton, Fink, & Harrington, 2007; Dymond,
Roche, Forsyth, Whelan, & Rhoden, 2007, 2008; Dymond
et al., 2011; Gil, Luciano, Ruiz, & Valdivia-Salas, 2012,
2014; Greenway, Dougher, & Wulfert, 1996; Roche, Barnes-
Holmes, Smeets, Barnes-Holmes, &McGeady, 2000; Whelan
& Barnes-Holmes, 2004; Whelan, Barnes-Holmes, &
Dymond, 2006). The transformation of function is controlled
by another verbal cue responsible for signaling the specific
stimulus function that will be transformed: the functional con-
text (Dougher, Perkins, Greenway, Koons, & Chiasson, 2002;
Perez, Fidalgo, Kovac, & Nico, 2015; Roche et al., 2000;
Wulfert & Hayes, 1988).
The following example may clarify the aforementioned
concepts. Suppose a person who is fearful of the box jellyfish
is told: “The blue ring octopus is more dangerous than the box
jellyfish.” This sentence is an instance of AARR in which the
stimuli blue ring octopus and box jellyfish are being arbitrarily
related. The expression more than acts as a relational context,
controlling responding to the blue ring octopus in terms of its
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comparative relationship to the box jellyfish. The word
dangerous acts as a functional context, indicating that the
comparison is based on a dimension of threat rather than size
or beauty, for example. Consequently, even if the person had
never heard of the blue ring octopus before, he or she can say
that it is more dangerous than, for example, a pufferfish
(which he or she knows is less dangerous than the box jelly-
fish). More interestingly, the mention or sight of the octopus
may elicit fear and evoke escape responses and will do so to a
higher degree than the mention or sight of the jellyfish.
Consequences of AARR
According to RFT, AARR’s importance to human behavior
derives from some of the characteristics of the constructed
stimuli relations (Hayes et al., 2001). First, the arbitrariness
of responding means that, given an appropriate contextual
cue, any stimulus can be related to any other. Thus, small
gestures, sounds, or notes on paper (responses that are easy
to produce and perceive) may acquire stimulus functions and
act as words. Second, the indirectness of responding suggests
that people may respond to a stimulus that they never encoun-
tered before through its relation to other stimuli. This enables
learning about remote or improbable events before they actu-
ally occur and about dangerous situations without risk to the
individual. Third, the derivativeness of respondingmeans that,
through mutual and combinatorial entailment, the establish-
ment of a few relations will lead to multiple derived relations,
dramatically increasing learning rates and creating complex
relational networks of stimuli. Together, these characteristics
suggest that AARRmay be foundational to what is commonly
referred to as human intelligence insofar as AARR is involved
in fundamental aspects of communication, reasoning, and
problem solving (Cassidy, Roche, & O’Hora, 2010).
Therefore, it is no surprise that the social community will
favor the development of AARR, modeling and reinforcing
relational responses through socially mediated consequences
(e.g., parents’ approval when their child says, “The stove is
hot”). Shortly thereafter, the enhanced probability of more
adaptive responses to environmental challenges due to trans-
formations of functions (e.g., the child avoiding touching the
stove because “the stove is hot”) will also contribute to in-
creased frequency of AARR over time. Initially, this will oc-
cur in a public manner, as observed in children’s increased
engagement in speech even when it does not serve a social
function (cf. Vygostky, 1978) and later, as some speech in-
stances are socially punished, in a private manner as thinking
(Skinner, 1957). In adults, AARR becomes so recurrent, flu-
ent, and fluid that some authors have described it metaphori-
cally as a stream (e.g., James, 1890).
According to RFT, over normal human development, ever-
increasing portions of the environment are responded to in
terms of arbitrarily applicable (i.e., verbal) relations to other
stimuli. Thus, many stimuli may acquire their functions solely
or mainly through verbal relations. Verbal relations come to
dominate over nonverbal learning processes unless these nor-
mal language-learning processes are disrupted through unusu-
al circumstances (e.g., trauma or developmental disorders).
When a person responds almost exclusively to the verbal con-
ditioned functions of a stimulus to the detriment of other,
nonverbal stimulus control, ACT therapists use the middle-
level term cognitive fusion (Hayes et al., 2012b).
RFT suggests that cognitive fusion is not inherently detri-
mental to the individual but becomes so when it leads to mal-
adaptive and rigid behavioral patterns. For example, faced
with an extended hand inviting a handshake, a person may
respond to multiple functions of the stimulus hand. These
may include the formal properties of the person’s hand, such
as its size, skin color, or shape, or the social consequences of
accepting or rejecting the handshake offer, such as approval or
criticism. It is also possible to respond to the hand as an object
that contains germs, which in turn cause diseases. For many
individuals, this set of verbal relations between disease and
hand may exert a weak influence under normal conditions of
multiple sources of stimulus control. For other individuals, the
verbal relations between disease and hand may dominate,
transforming the aversive functions of disease to the hand,
and may render other potential sources of stimulus control
irrelevant. We now have cognitive fusion. In this case, the
verbally acquired, derived functions have more strength than
the other formal or directly established stimulus functions, and
the derived relation’s influence over behavior will be exten-
sive, eliciting and evoking specific responses, such as fear and
avoidance, with great probability. If the functional transforma-
tions that occur are not sensitive to the current context (e.g., a
person’s hand will always be diseased and aversive, whether it
is clean or dirty), their influence over behavior will become
more generalized across different situations, further increasing
the probability of fear and avoidance responses.
The high magnitude and low context sensitivity of stimulus
functions combine to dramatically increase the likelihood of a
specific response (or set of responses). Given that time is
finite, when a response increases in probability, other incom-
patible ones must decrease in likelihood (Baum, 2002;
Herrnstein, 1970). All other responses are improbable in this
situation: One’s response pattern is rigid regarding that stim-
ulus. AsWilson andMurrell (2004) pointed out: “The primary
problem with conditioned aversives is not that the individual
avoids or becomes aroused. The problem is that they only
become aroused and avoid” (p. 129). In this example, such a
rigid avoidance pattern prevents meaningful social interac-
tions and contributes to a narrowing of the person’s life.
To this individual, the experience of cognitive fusion is one
of being surrounded and dominated by thoughts, with these
thoughts automatically generating behavior, so much so that
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the actual functional verbal relations controlling behavior are
not apparent. Other sources of influence are minimized, and
the experience of choice is reduced. The person merely reacts
to the content of these verbal relations, even when the person
is aware that this rigid pattern is not in his or her best interest
and leads to problematic consequences. This is well described
by ACT’s metaphors of entanglement and oneness: being
stuck, caught up, and fused.
Because unlearning is not possible (Bouton, 2002;
Falls, 1998), it is necessary for the individual to obtain
new and different learning experiences to diminish the
strength of derived stimulus functions and counteract their
extensive dominance over behavior that leads to rigidity.
However, AARR’s characteristics may interfere with this
process. More specifically, AARR enables the individual
to respond to an event in an indirect manner through its
relation with other stimuli. Despite the advantages gained
by this characteristic, it also allows for changes in the
salience or probability of the event to be unnoticed by
the person, who will continue to respond to it through
previously established verbal relations. In other words,
the individual may be insensitive to the current environ-
ment and remain under the control of derived verbal rela-
tions (cf. Galizio, 1979; Hayes, Brownstein, Zettle,
Rosenfarb, & Korn, 1986; Matthews, Shimoff, Catania,
& Sagvolden, 1977; Shimoff, Catania, & Matthews,
1981).
Furthermore, even if the person comes into direct contact
with the altered contingencies, it may not be sufficient to alter
his or her responding (cf. Hayes et al., 1986; Pilgrim &
Galizio, 1990, 1995; Roche, Barnes, & Smeets, 1997;
Shimoff et al., 1981). After all, the maintenance of verbal
coherence is a powerful automatic reinforcer (Bordieri,
Kellum, Wilson, & Whiteman, 2015; Quiñones & Hayes,
2014; Wray, Dougher, Hamilton, & Guinther, 2012), and it
may be stronger than the reinforcement instated by the new
contingencies. As repeatedly shown by the extensive literature
on confirmation bias, people tend to search for and
overevaluate information congruent with their previously
established relations (Nickerson, 1998), therefore reducing
the impact of new learning experiences.
The Objective of Cognitive Defusion
For clients whose psychological problems are maintained
or exacerbated by verbally conditioned stimuli that pro-
mote rigid and unadaptive response patterns, cognitive–
behavioral therapists have commonly chosen cognitive
res t ruc tur ing in te rvent ions . In br ief , cogni t ive
restructuring is a collaborative effort in which both the
client and therapist logically and empirically evaluate
and dispute the client’s thought content and underlying
beliefs, assumptions, and schemas (Dobson, 2009;
Leahy, 2003). In other words, the therapist helps the client
to contact incoherencies between his or her cognitions and
other thoughts (logical) or environmental events
(empirical).
From an RFT perspective, cognitive restructuring’s main
objective is that the client will engage in AARR, developing
new stimulus relations that are more sensitive to current con-
ditions and contextual subtleties than the previously
established ones (Blackledge, Moran, & Ellis, 2009).
Strengthening these new verbal relations will favor their in-
fluence on behavior, diminishing the dominance of the func-
tional control that resulted from transformations due to the
previous relations. Therefore, the verbal control over behavior
is maintained but altered.
Over the last 30 years, ACT has constructed an alternative
model that explicitly minimizes cognitive restructuring while
emphasizing cognitive defusion interventions. The aim of
cognitive defusion is not to create new stimulus relations but
to disrupt the transformations of functions that occur in in-
stances of AARR by means of its functional context.
Therefore, rather than altering the content of verbalizations,
cognitive defusion diminishes their impact on behavior
(Blackledge, 2007; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis,
2006; Hayes et al., 2012b). By decreasing the verbally condi-
tioned functions of a stimulus, its directly conditioned func-
tions as well as other stimuli (especially nonverbal) become
more likely to exert influence over behavior, possibly evoking
more adaptive responses. This may reduce the experience of
entanglement and fusion and enhance the experience of choice
among different alternatives, increasing response flexibility
(i.e., reducing rigidity).
The Procedures of Cognitive Defusion
A large number of defusion exercises, created within the prac-
tice of ACT or borrowed from other practices and cultures,
have been used to diminish the impact of AARR on behavior.
Some of them, retrieved from Blackledge (2015); Hayes et al.
(2012b); and Luoma and Hayes (2009), will be briefly
outlined in the following sections.
Playing With Words
In these exercises, the client selects a word or small phrase that
exerts control over behavior. He or she is instructed to “play”
with the word, repeating it out loud for 30 s (word repetition);
repeating it using funny voices, such as those of cartoon char-
acters (silly voices); repeating it slowly, each syllable at a time
(slow speech); singing it (singing thoughts); or using its syn-
onym in a foreign language (word translation).
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Questioning Verbal Coherence
These procedures question commonly attributed causes of be-
havior. The client may be asked to write his or her life story
but change its consequences for his or her present self (create a
new story); list all of his or her defining characteristics, notice
the list’s incongruities, and eliminate the characteristics from
the list one by one (I am); or repeatedly answer “Why?” ques-
tions regarding behavior until he or she has no reasons left
(Why, why, why?).
Disrupting Thought–Action
These exercises produce experiences of incongruity between
thoughts and actions. They include having clients convince
themselves not to perform a simple physical action and then
do it (thoughts and feelings aren’t causes); carry cards with
written thoughts, including I can’t walk, while walking around
(carrying cards); or participate in a role-playing exercise in
which the therapist and client alternate between the person
(who must walk around and guide the pair) and the person’s
mind (whichmust constantly describe, evaluate, and compare)
without either one interrupting the role of the other (take your
mind for a walk).
Observing the Process of Relational Responding
These interventions require the client to attend to the activity
of relational responding. In order to do so, various mindful-
ness exercises are used in which the client must observe his or
her thoughts, for example, as leaves falling on a river (leaves
on a stream) or posters carried by soldiers marching (soldiers
in the parade) without interrupting the flow. The client can
also be asked to observe his or her flow of private events
across multiple instances in his or her past and to attend to
the person who is observing these experiences (observer
exercise).
Identifying Relational Responses
In these procedures, the client is asked to identify different
instances of relational responses. He or she can do so by la-
beling them as worries, judgments, comparisons, and so on
(cubbyholing); differentiating formal from evaluative proper-
ties (bad cup metaphor); introducing the prefix “I am having a
thought that. ..” (having thoughts); or being thankful for the
thought (mental appreciation).
Converting Into Physical Objects
These exercises attribute physical characteristics to thoughts,
turning them into objects with properties such as size, color,
and texture (physicalizing); passengers on a bus that the client
is driving (passengers on a bus); fingers that can be close or far
from one’s face (hands as thoughts); or words written on a
sheet of paper (content on cards).
Exercises’ Outcomes in Component Studies
Some defusion exercises have been investigated in component
studies that attempt to separate a clinical procedure from its
larger therapeutic package, such as ACT, in order to isolate its
effects (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012). Several
studies have investigated the effects of the word repetition
exercise on the emotional discomfort associated with and the
believability of thoughts, obtaining positive outcomes on both
measures (Barrera, Szafranski, Ratcliff, Garnaat, & Norton,
2015; Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011; De
Young, Lavender, Washington, Looby, & Anderson, 2010;
Keogh, 2008; Mandavia et al., 2015; Masuda, Feinstein,
Wendell, & Sheehan, 2010b; Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, &
Twohig, 2004; Masuda et al., 2009; Masuda et al., 2010a;
Ritzert, Forsyth, Berghoff, Barnes-Holmes, & Nicholson,
2015; Tyndall, Papworth, Roche, & Bennett, 2017; Watson,
2007).
The emotional discomfort and believability of thoughts
were further explored using the having thoughts exercise,
attaining mixed results (Healy et al., 2008; O’Sullivan,
2013; Pilecki & McKay, 2012). This procedure has also been
found to alleviate the effects of a learned helplessness induc-
tion on problem solving (Hooper & McHugh, 2013) and de-
crease cigarette smokers’ approach and consumption behavior
(Beadman et al., 2015).
The carrying cards exercise coupled with ACT’s “swamp
metaphor” (cf. Hayes et al., 2012b) has been shown to de-
crease escape or avoidance behavior due to aversive stimula-
tion without significantly affecting emotional discomfort
(Gutiérrez, Luciano, Rodríguez, & Fink, 2004; Kehoe et al.,
2014; McMullen et al., 2008). The same has been found with
the content on cards exercise combined with a variation of
ACT’s observer exercise (Luciano et al., 2014). A variation
of the observer exercise has also been used to reduce disrup-
tive behavior in children, with positive results (Luciano et al.,
2011); in combination with word repetition, it has also been
used to reduce implicit anxiety measures (Kishita, Muto,
Ohtsuki, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014).
Mindfulness strategies (e.g., leaves on a stream) have di-
minished the emotional discomfort occasioned by thoughts
(Foody, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Rai, & Luciano,
2015; Marcks & Woods, 2005), whereas silly voices as an
adjunct intervention to exposure and response prevention re-
duced the frequency of problem behavior in children with
autism (Eilers & Hayes, 2015).
Finally, studies that combine more than one cognitive
defusion procedure into a larger protocol have obtained posi-
tive results with spider fear (Golijani-Moghaddam, 2011;
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Wagener & Zettle, 2011); overeating (Hooper, Sandoz,
Ashton, Clarke, & McHugh, 2012; Jenkins & Tapper, 2014;
Moffitt, Brinkworth, Noakes, & Mohr, 2012); dysphoria
(Hinton & Gaynor, 2010); and discomfort and willingness to
experience negative self-relevant thoughts (Larsson, Hooper,
Osborne, Bennett, &McHugh, 2016). However, one study did
not obtain positive results with avoidance in claustrophobia
(Dublin, 2012).
The Process of Cognitive Defusion
The aforementioned studies suggest that defusion procedures
are capable of producing important behavioral changes.
However, they do not address the underlying change process-
es involved (Dymond, Roche, & Bennett, 2013; Levin &
Villatte, 2016). The most widely used account of the mecha-
nism of change in cognitive defusion interventions is offered
by Blackledge (2007). The author’s proposal is based on ex-
periments that demonstrated contextual control over function-
al transformations in AARR (e.g., Dougher et al., 2002; Perez
et al., 2015; Roche et al., 2000; Wulfert & Hayes, 1988).
According to Blackledge (2007), a “context of literality” ex-
ists at the societal level that supports AARR and its effects,
including fusion. This context includes properties common to
everyday language, such as grammatical structure, speech ve-
locity, congruence between emotional tone and content, main-
tenance of verbal coherence, and attending to the products of
relational responding (i.e., derived relations and transforma-
tions of functions). As Blackledge stated, these contextual
commonalities across verbal interactions enable function
transformation. Under normal social conditions, the context
of literality is in place and AARR will occur naturally and at
high strength. Alternatively, cognitive defusion procedures
call attention to and disrupt the context of literality. With the
context of literality disrupted, thoughts may still occur, but the
functional transformations produced by AARR may be re-
duced. In the words of Blackledge (2007):
In other words, certain contextual conditions must be in
place for verbally specific processes to change stimulus
functions (i.e., for cognitive fusion to occur). We can
thus logically assume that changing these contextual
conditions in certain ways would lead to a disruption
of these verbally based functional transformations.
This, it is argued, is the essence of cognitive defusion.
(p. 561)
This conceptualization poses some difficulties. First, as the
author stated, it logically assumes that the process of defusion
is the opposite of fusion (i.e., introduction or removal of con-
textual cues) because their results are opposite (i.e., an in-
crease or decrease of function transformations through verbal
relations). However, that is not necessarily the case. An event
can be opposed to another along one dimension but not an-
other. For example, fridge is opposed to stove regarding tem-
perature (i.e., one is cold and the other is hot) but not weight
(i.e., both are heavy). Analogically, given that cognitive fusion
and defusion are opposed in their results, it does not necessar-
ily follow that they must be opposed in terms of process.
This reasoning is supported by experimental evidence that
considers a variety of learning processes neglected by
Blackledge’s (2007) account. Equifinality is probable in hu-
man learning: Different learning pathways (processes) can
lead a stimulus to acquire similar functions (result). For exam-
ple, analogous fear and avoidance responses can be generated
by stimuli whose functions were learned through direct con-
ditioning, observation, instruction, and derived relational
responding (Cameron, Roche, Schlund, & Dymond, 2016;
Dymond, Schlund, Roche, De Houwer, & Freegard, 2012).
The importance of considering multiple behavioral pro-
cesses is heightened by the fact that a stimulus whose function
was acquired through verbal relations can have its magnitude
diminished through nonverbal processes. For example, extinc-
tion effects produced nonrelationally through respondent or
operant extinction may generalize to verbally related stimuli
(Dougher et al., 1994; Luciano et al., 2014; Roche, Kanter,
Brown, Dymond, & Fogarty, 2010; Vervoort, Vervliet,
Bennett, & Baeyens, 2014). As Kanter (2013) states, “even
if clinical problems do arise in ways suggested by experimen-
tal RFT research, this does not justify the conclusion that the
clinical problems need to be targeted with relational interven-
tions” (p. 230).
To sum up, a resulting functional transformation does not
precisely specify the process by which the stimulus produced
it, and the process of function reduction does not have to be a
functional opposite of the process of function acquisition.
Furthermore, Blackledge’s (2007) conceptualization does not
readily account for the differences in behavioral effects be-
tween different defusion procedures. For instance, the litera-
ture reviewed previously indicates that the word repetition,
leaves on a stream, and soldiers in the parade exercises pro-
duce reductions in emotional discomfort (e.g., Masuda et al.,
2010a). However, both the carrying cards and content on cards
exercises produce significant changes in escape or avoidance
behavior—in some cases, decreasing it to a minimum—but do
not produce reductions in emotional discomfort (e.g.,
Gutiérrez et al., 2004; Luciano et al., 2014). It is difficult to
comprehend how a single process could produce such distinct
results.
An Alternative Proposal
An alternative account that can better accommodate the em-
pirical evidence and the potential for a plurality of learning
mechanisms is possible. In what follows, we will attempt to
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provide such an account. Our main argument is that the reduc-
tion of transformation of function through verbal relations is
an outcome that can be obtained through different basic be-
havioral processes. This idea is not entirely novel and has been
briefly considered in at least one previous publication (Healy
et al., 2008).
As a starting point, consider ACT exercises that in-
volve word play (word repetition, silly voices, slow
speech, singing thoughts, and word translation). These
are basically exposure procedures in which the client re-
peatedly contacts a stimulus of high magnitude, without
other associated stimuli, until its verbally conditioned
eliciting functions are reduced. Thus, these exercises al-
low other stimulus features to be responded to, such as the
sensation of the mouth while pronouncing different audi-
tory aspects of the word, as reported by clients (Hayes
et al., 2012b). Sometimes a playful context supplements
the intervention, eliciting emotional responses incompati-
ble with the previous response pattern.
As is the case with other exposure interventions, the
precise mechanism of change involved in these exercises
is unclear (cf. Tryon, 2005). More specifically, it is pos-
sible to conceptualize them as working through the pro-
cess of respondent extinction, in which the repeated pre-
sentation of the stimulus is sufficient to decrease its func-
tion strength (Tryon, 2005). Alternatively, countercondi-
tioning processes in which one response is replaced by
another may be at play (Tryon, 2005). A third possibility
is that inhibitory learning processes may occur, creating
new relations among stimuli that establish the previously
feared stimuli as safe (Craske, Treanor, Conway,
Zbozinek, & Vervliet, 2014).
Basic research indicates that the effects of exposure
may generalize to other verbally related stimuli,
diminishing their functional strength (Dougher et al.,
1994; Luciano et al., 2013; Roche et al., 2010; Vervoort
et al., 2014). This suggests not only that defusion proce-
dures may decrease the functional dominance of particular
stimuli or functions but also that this decrease may in turn
occur for verbally related stimuli. Thus, function transfor-
mation is reduced. Indeed, some authors have argued that
cognitive defusion, in some cases, may involve no more
than exposure and derived extinction (Roche et al., 2010;
Wilson & Murrell, 2004).
In contrast, cognitive defusion exercises that disrupt the
link between thought and action (thoughts and feelings aren’t
causes, carrying cards, and take your mind for a walk) may be
conceptualized as procedures that work through differential
reinforcement. These procedures require the client to come
into contact with a stimulus of high magnitude and emit re-
sponses that differ from the rigid response usually evoked by
the stimulus. These responses will be reinforced by either the
therapist (social reinforcement) or naturally through
engagement in valued activities. Through differential rein-
forcement of alternative responses (DRA) in the clinical con-
text (cf. Vollmer & Iwata, 1992), the correlation between the
stimulus and the operant response is reduced; consequently,
the stimulus’s evocative functions are diminished. The
thought becomes a discriminative stimulus for other
responses.
Basic research suggests that function reduction through
differential reinforcement transforms the function of verbally
related stimuli (Bones et al., 2001; Broothaerts, 2015). Thus,
defusion procedures may reduce function transformation
through this process. Dymond, Dunsmoor, Vervliet, Roche,
and Hermans (2014) offered a similar interpretation:
For example, one technique known as “defusion”
(Masuda et al., 2004) teaches the client how to perform
other instrumental responses in the presence of fear
stimuli and to thereby broaden the response functions
of fear stimuli rather than narrow them. In effect, the
multiplicity of response functions that get established
in the therapeutic setting . . . compete with the normally
dominant fear and avoidance functions and reduce the
probability of fear and avoidance emerging on each oc-
casion. (p. 38)
This last category of procedures maps most closely onto the
definition of defusion offered by Blackledge (2007) insofar as
it alters the context around the verbal relations targeted.
However, it diverges from it regarding the contextual opera-
tion performed. If, as Blackledge (2007) stated, a functional
contextual cue is removed, it is very likely that another vari-
able will, for historical reasons, take its functional role. The
same would not occur if a procedure recontextualizes relation-
al responses, introducing cues that act as alternative functional
contexts and directly diminish function transformation. Some
cognitive defusion exercises attempt this strategy and typical-
ly introduce one of two types of functional contexts.
The first functional context is descriptive autoclitics, or
verbal stimuli that offer information regarding the variables
controlling one’s verbal behavior (cf. Skinner, 1957). For ex-
ample, to describe a speaker as a liar, insane, or biased changes
the impact of his or her verbal responses on the listener (e.g.,
McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004), usually
minimizing it. Some defusion exercises use descriptive
autoclitics to depict the thought flow as a narrative that is
coherent but, nevertheless, does not necessarily correspond
to reality, being arbitrary, creative, flawed, and with distin-
guishable story components (e.g., create a new story; I am;
why, why, why?; mental appreciation; bad cup metaphor; hav-
ing thoughts; cubbyholing; observer exercise).
The second commonly used functional context locates
one’s relational response at a spatial distance from oneself
(there as opposed to here). The literature on discounting (cf.
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Rachlin, 2006) establishes that a stimulus decreases its value
as a function of its probability of occurrence and temporal
delay. Studies with primates (Kralik & Sampson, 2012;
Long & Platt, 2005; Stevens, Rosati, Ross, & Hauser, 2005)
and with humans (Brown, Reed, & Harris, 2002; Hannon,
1994; Pate & Loomis, 1997) suggest that the same holds true
with respect to spatial distance: Increased distance from a
stimulus leads to reduced stimulus control. Additional evi-
dence comes from self-distancing studies, in which
reexperiencing an emotional memory in the third person (dis-
tanced perspective) reduces overt and covert emotional
responding in comparison to reimagining it in the first person
(immersed perspective; e.g., Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Kross,
Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Kross, Gard, Deldin, Clifton, &
Ayduk, 2012; Mischkowski, Kross, & Bushman, 2012).
Therefore, defusion exercises that verbally recontextualize
the client’s relational responses as physical objects in the dis-
tance (posters in soldiers in the parade; leaves in leaves on a
stream; passengers in passengers on a bus; imaginary objects
in physicalizing; hands in hands as thoughts; and written
words in content on cards) may diminish ensuing transforma-
tions of function through this process. This process is clearly
central to ACT. In fact, the distancemetaphor was emphasized
in ACT’s original name, “comprehensive distancing” (Zettle,
2005).
To conclude, the present account proposes that cognitive
defusion (i.e., reductions in verbal function transformations)
can occur through different mechanisms of change, and pro-
cedures described in the literature may operate through one of
these processes or more than one in combination (see Table 1).
Extinction strategies diminish the eliciting functions of stimuli
through extinction, counterconditioning, or inhibitory learn-
ing processes, whereas DRA exercises diminish the evocative
functions of stimuli through differential reinforcement.
Consequently, their reduced functions diminish the strength
of the transformed functions to verbally related stimuli.
However, contextual strategies reduce the transformation of
function directly through the introduction of alternative func-
tional contexts that disrupt this process.
Conceptual and Clinical Implications
Throughout this article, the distinction among cognitive
defusion procedure, process, and outcome has been empha-
sized. We define a procedure as the manipulation of environ-
mental events, a process as the changes in the interaction
between the organism and its environment, and an outcome
as the change in the organism’s dispositional state or behav-
ioral tendency (Lopes, 2008). More often than not, discus-
sions about cognitive defusion do not differentiate among
these three phenomena, and the term cognitive defusion is
used to refer to all of them interchangeably (Barnes-Holmes
et al., 2016; McEnteggart et al., 2015). By doing so, the con-
cept’s precision is reduced. Given that precision is pursued by
both CBS and science in general and that pragmatic utility in
CBS is partially a function of defining its terms at the most
useful levels of precision (Hayes et al., 2012a), it may be
useful to distinguish these phenomena herein. Specifically,
there are several defusion exercises used during therapy, such
as word repetition, take your mind for a walk, and having
thoughts (procedures), and distinct defusion mechanisms of
change underlying these exercises, such as extinction, differ-
ential reinforcement, and recontextualization (processes).
Given this diversity of procedures and processes, their
outcomes may have variations, such as in the specific
stimulus function affected. McEnteggart et al. (2015)
expressed this concern as follows:
Of course, we are neither denying that defusion tech-
niques exist, nor that fusion can be reduced, nor that
any of this cannot happen through a process of defusion,
instead we are simply saying that the same concept can-
not be all three types of phenomena. (p. 57)
Assuming that the term cognitive defusion is maintained as a
purportedly pragmatically useful concept in ACT, it may ben-
efit the stated goals to develop a conventional use of the term
inwhich its referent is unambiguous.We suggest that its use as
an outcome descriptor may be the most beneficial and the least
Table 1 Summary of the different pathways to cognitive defusion
General procedure Change process ACT exercises
Exposure Respondent extinction, counterconditioning,
or inhibitory learning




Differential reinforcement Thoughts and feelings aren’t causes, carrying
cards, take your mind for a walk
Introduction of contextual cue Recontextualization of thinking as a narrative
(descriptive autoclitic)
Having thoughts, cubbyholing, create a new
story, mental appreciation, I am, bad cup
metaphor, observer exercise
Recontextualization of thinking as spatially distant Leaves on a stream, physicalizing, content on
cards, passengers on a bus, hands as thoughts
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susceptible to confusion. To be more specific, we discuss
defusion as the effect of reducing the function transformations
that occur in verbal relations through one of several processes.
These processes, in turn, may be produced by various exer-
cises that can now be more meaningfully distinguished from
each other on the basis of their differing underlying processes.
The present discussion has parallels with Cordova’s (2001)
thesis regarding the eponymous ACT term acceptance. The
author suggested that “acceptance might be operationally de-
fined as a change in the behavior evoked by a stimulus from
that functioning to avoid, escape or destroy to behavior func-
tioning to maintain or pursue contact” (p. 215). Cordova de-
scribes multiple processes and procedures responsible for
such change, suggesting that acceptance is best defined as an
outcome. Indeed, all of the terms of ACT’s psychological
flexibility model may be defined as outcomes rather than pro-
cedures or processes, suggesting that ACT’s overall aims in-
clude increased contact with private events (acceptance), de-
creased control of verbal relations (cognitive defusion), in-
creased sensitivity to present contingencies (contact with the
present moment), development of a different perspective of
the self (sense of self-as-context), increased clarity about what
is important (values), and engagement in behaviors congruent
with one’s values (committed action).
Our proposed clarification of cognitive defusion as an out-
come rather than a process has implications for the practition-
er. Specifically, one of the cornerstones of clinical behavior
analysis (which includes ACT) is functional analysis
(Callaghan & Darrow, 2015; Dougher, 1999), which is the
identification and description of functional relations among
environmental events and the person’s actions (cf. Haynes &
O’Brien, 1990; Sturmey, 1996). Functional analysis relates to
both case conceptualization and intervention planning through
the identification of problematic organism–environment rela-
tions that are causing psychological suffering, the selection of
the behavioral processes capable of altering these relations,
and the choice of intervention procedures that target these
behavioral processes. Without proper functional assessment,
the selection of intervention procedures may be ineffective or
iatrogenic (cf. Iwata, Dorsey, Slifer, Bauman, & Richman,
1982). Thus, as a clinical behavioral therapy, ACT’s
decision-making process must be primarily guided by func-
tional analysis and not simply protocols and procedures (Bach
&Moran, 2008;Westrup, 2014). By achieving clarity over the
basic processes involved in the outcome of cognitive defusion,
the clinician can more effectively choose between interven-
tions based on their processes and not their procedures.
Having determined that the client would benefit from a reduc-
tion of function transformation caused by verbal relations (i.e.,
defusion), the therapist can select which behavioral process
has the highest probability of being effective given the spe-
cifics of the case (e.g., extinction, differential reinforcement,
or recontextualization). In turn, the therapist can choose from
an array of procedures in the literature or even formulate new
ones to bring about the relevant process. Consequently, the
therapist’s decision making increases in coherence, flexibility,
and creativity.
As an example of the aforementioned decision-making
process, consider two hypothetical clients, Alexandra and
Rodrigo. Alexandra presents as a high-functioning executive
who goes to work every day but spends hours behind her
closed office door crying uncontrollably, overwhelmed by
thoughts that she is a failure. Alexandra’s absorption in her
private events and her high emotional arousal interferes with
the quality of her work to such an extent that the therapist may
choose defusion exercises that target respondent extinction.
Rodrigo, in contrast, suffers from social anxiety, is dominated
by thoughts that he will suffer a social humiliation if he goes
out in public, and has difficulty leaving home. Because his
avoidance is fairly complete, he does not display high levels of
emotional arousal. His therapist may choose exercises that
target operant processes that focus more on the avoidance that
results from verbal transformations of function. In both cases,
the therapist’s focus is on valued living. However, the process
to achieve that varies because the case conceptualization
differs.
Finally, imagine a therapist who decides, based on a func-
tionally based case conceptualization, to recontextualize the
client’s thoughts. By being under the control of the process
that he or she ought to foster, the therapist is able to select (or
even design) and implement a procedure that resonates with
the client’s current repertoire and strengths, enhancing the
probability of a successful intervention. For example, an ar-
chitect who has great capacity to imagine three-dimensional
objects may easily be able to objectify his or her thoughts,
whereas a vigorous reader may be better able to see his or
her thoughts as a narrative.
Future Research Directions
This article offers an account of the processes of change in
cognitive defusion. The formulation was based on the behav-
ior–analytic literature of stimulus function transformations
and existing component studies of cognitive defusion proce-
dures. Additional research is necessary to elucidate the pro-
cesses involved in cognitive defusion as an outcome. Three
research implications are relevant. First, future analog compo-
nent process studies on cognitive defusion procedures (Levin
et al., 2012) would benefit from carefully considering how
they conceptualize defusion in generating hypotheses about
the independent and dependent variables involved. If different
processes underlie various defusion interventions, results
should differ across studies. For example, exposure proce-
dures should readily alter eliciting functions, whereas DRA
procedures may readily affect evocative functions. The
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aforementioned component studies offer preliminary support
for this idea. Specifically, word repetition (an exposure exer-
cise) decreases emotional arousal (an eliciting function; e.g.,
Masuda et al., 2004, 2009; Masuda et al., 2010a), and carrying
cards (a DRA exercise) decreases avoidance (an evocative
function) despite the maintenance of high emotional arousal
(Gutiérrez et al., 2004). However, no study has directly com-
pared the effects of different cognitive defusion procedures
yet. This matter requires urgent empirical attention.
Second, experimental analog studies offer many of the ben-
efits of component studies insofar as their dependent variables
are behaviors analogous to clinical problems (e.g., emotional
arousal, avoidance). These studies differ, however, regarding
the independent variable. Instead of complete exercises, the
relational processes themselves are manipulated, allowing for
greater experimental control over the process of change
(Dymond et al., 2013; Levin & Villatte, 2016). This type of
research is encouraged. Research examining derived extinc-
tion provides such an example (e.g., Luciano et al., 2013;
Roche et al., 2010; Vervoort et al., 2014). These studies create
de novo equivalence classes between arbitrary stimuli.
Through direct conditioning, one member of the class typical-
ly acquires an eliciting or evocative function (e.g., fear or
avoidance), which transforms the function of all other class
members. Then, one member of the class is submitted to an
extinction procedure to allow for a subsequent test for gener-
alization of extinction to other class members. Thus, derived
extinction may be a suitable experimental analog for interven-
tions that promote cognitive defusion through respondent pro-
cesses and may inform practitioners with data from controlled
environments.
Third, studies using clinical samples and clinical practices
are required. Single-subject designs, if used systematically,
may show the direct benefits of defusion procedures. Clarity
about the use of the concept of cognitive defusion as an out-
come as opposed to a process will make defusion interven-
tions more amenable to direct empirical investigation and al-
low for easier and more effective comparison across case stud-
ies and studies using single-subject designs. Process analyses
of group designs may also observe and report on the more
precise independent variable–dependent variable relations
proposed herein. To do this research, development of clinical-
ly useful measures of defusion processes (e.g., distinguishing
eliciting from evocative functions of defusion procedures)
would be useful.
Conclusion
As ACT continues to accumulate empirical support across
diagnoses and presentation problems, efforts to train and dis-
seminate ACT that emphasize its clinical model of middle-
level terms will undoubtedly increase. However, as we have
shown, at least one of these terms (cognitive defusion) has
evolved in popularity and practice without being used with
great precision, accommodating a large relational network of
procedures, processes, and results. The conflation of multiple
distinguishable phenomena in a single concept may be an
obstacle to the overall agenda of CBS in developing “basic
and applied scientific concepts that are useful in predicting
and influencing the contextually embedded actions of whole
organisms, individually and in groups, with precision, scope
and depth” (Hayes et al., 2012a, p. 2). Throughout the con-
ceptual development of cognitive defusion, the clarification of
basic processes (mechanisms of change) underlying these in-
terventions and responsible for these outcomes was not em-
phasized. However, because of the functional nature of behav-
ior–analytic explanations, this discussion is important and
should guide research and clinical practice.
We hope to stimulate discussion on the clarity of middle-
level terms; to provide an alternate, more precise conceptual-
ization of cognitive defusion; and to provide a framework that
may clarify future analog component, experimental, and clin-
ical research studies on defusion and the practice of clinicians.
All three types of research ought to be valuable additions to
the body of research on ACT because they will aid in clarify-
ing the basic processes that contribute to ACT’s efficacy. The
overall goal is not only to improve the treatment delivery’s
quality but also to identify functionally defined, empirically
supported principles of change (cf. Rosen & Davison, 2003)
that in the future may guide clinical practice independent of
protocolized treatment packages, with greater integration
among different contextual–behavioral psychotherapies
(Callaghan & Darrow, 2015).
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